Affective Sphere, Heart at its Center, Inferior to Intellect?

I just started reading The Role of the Heart by Dietrich Von Hildebrand and so far it is interesting in how he points out that philosophically the affective sphere, the heart at its center, is considered to be inferior to that of one's intellect.   Von Hildebrand claims that there is a misunderstanding of affective sphere due to the varying wide range of experiences that we experience from our heart - from bodily feelings to holy joy to deep contrition - but why is the intellect considered superior to our heart among philosophers?  We have examples in scripture of the affective sphere, such as the holy joy of St. Simeon when holding the infant Jesus, or the contrition of St. Peter after his denial of Jesus so why is the heart considered inferior to the intellect?

Aesthetics: Objective or Subjective?

I am going to focus on the philosophy of aesthetics in this post. There is a saying "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" which gives example to beauty being subjective. Is it possible for beauty to be objective? Is the Mass objectively beautiful? Do you consider the Sistine Chapel to be an example of objective beauty? According to Wikipedia, Plato felt that beautiful objects incorporated proportion, harmony, and unity among their parts. How does one distinguish between an object or piece of art being subjectively beautiful versus objectively beautiful?

Fr. Barron and Dr. Scott Hahn Discuss Apologetics & the New Atheism

Edmund Burke Quote On Wealth

"If we command our wealth, we shall be rich and free; if our wealth commands us, we are poor indeed."

By: Edmund Burke

Wealth can be a very good thing, but please don't let your wealth rule your life... And, do not become materialistic or please don't follow the philosophy of materialism.

Exploring Nicomachean Ethics Part 2

We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss

thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an

uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by

friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better,

indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to

destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers

or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to

honour truth above our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of

classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority

(which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an

Idea embracing all numbers); but the term 'good' is used both in the

category of substance and in that of quality and in that of

relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature

to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of

being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these

goods. Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it

is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of

reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e.

of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in

time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right

locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally

present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been

predicated in all the categories but in one only. Further, since of

the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would

have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many

sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of

opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in

disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine

and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the

question, what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is

the case) in 'man himself' and in a particular man the account of

man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in

no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will 'good itself' and

particular goods, in so far as they are good. But again it will not be

good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no

whiter than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to

give a more plausible account of the good, when they place the one

in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have

followed.

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what

we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the

Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the

goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good by

reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce or to

preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by

reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods

must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves,

the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in

themselves from things useful, and consider whether the former are

called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort of goods would

one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when

isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain

pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake

of something else, yet one would place them among things good in

themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in

itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have

named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will

have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of

whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour,

wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the

accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some

common element answering to one Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the

things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by

being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are

they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is

reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these

subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect

precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of

philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is

some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable

of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be

achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something

attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to

recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and

achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know

better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall

attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash

with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they

aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one

side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the arts

should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is

not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will

be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself',

or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better

doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health

in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of

a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough

of these topics.

I found it very interesting that those who originally introduced the doctrine of the universal good (now it is known as the common good) did not consider the issue of class and/or different classes. Maybe, in today's times we shouldn't let class or politics determine the meaning of the common good and how it is to be achieved but rather we should look to God to determine the meaning of the common good and how it is going to be implemented so that it is achieved? 

Humanae Vitae: Explained and Defended

Humanae Vitae Explained And Defended

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Interesting Saying by C.S. Lewis

In The Four Loves by C.S. Lewis, Lewis writes "If Affection is made the absolute sovereign of a human life the seeds will germinate. Love, having become a god, becomes a demon."

I found this quote to be very interesting.

Exploring Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle Part 1

I have been delving deeper into various philosophical works. I have started reading NICOMACHEAN ETHICS by Aristotle ( translated by W.D. Ross) and have found the it quite interesting.

Here is the first few paragraphs:

EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit,
is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has
rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a
certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others
are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where
there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the
products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many
actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of
the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of
strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall
under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned
with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this
and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts
fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts
are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the
sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference
whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or
something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the
sciences just mentioned.

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for
its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and
if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for
at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire
would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the
chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence
on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more
likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at
least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or
capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most
authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And
politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains
which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each
class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should
learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities
to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since
politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from,
the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this
end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a
single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events
something greater and more complete whether to attain or to
preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one
man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for
city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims,
since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

Does the State have a greater cause than man? Should the State really dictate to man what is right and what is wrong? And to what extent, if so? How much should the State interfere into our lives?